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SUMMARY
Although the asset data from the Health and Retirement Study (HRS) is of very high quality, there is sufficient
noise to frustrate attempts to study saving behaviour by examining wave-to-wave change in wealth. In this
research, we attempt to reduce noise by means of reactive-dependent interviewing in which respondents
with large inexplicable changes in assets between 1998 and 2000 are called back by HRS interviewers,
presented with their prior reports and asked to reconcile the data. We achieved reconciliation for 1255
households (2479 net-worth components) and, as a result, the variance in measured change for the entire
sample of 11,583 households with the same financial respondents in both waves was cut in half. The empirical
validity of the data also appears to have been improved. The correlation of gross change in net worth and
income, for instance, increased from an insignificant negative to a highly significant positive value. Although
reconciliation of large asset changes marginally improves the goodness of fit of multivariate models, there
remains sufficient noise in the asset-change data to require analysts to employ additional methods to reduce
the influence of outliers. Copyright  2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
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1. INTRODUCTION
One of the most important goals of the Health and Retirement Survey is to track household
economic status as individuals age from pre-retirement to death. Saving behaviour before and
during retirement will have a critical impact on the economic well-being of the old over the next
several decades. Panel data provide unique opportunities for the analysis of saving as well as other
behavioural dynamics by measuring change at the individual level (see e.g. Lansing and Morgan,
1971; Hsiao, 1986). While saving can, in theory, be estimated from wave-to-wave change in net-
worth components and aggregates, spurious change in these measures has frustrated many attempts
at estimating saving from the panel data. To see why this might be so, note that the observed net
worth (W) at any wave (t) of a panel for each individual (j) can be expressed as the sum of the
true value of net worth (WŁ) and measurement error (ε). Gross saving (S) between one wave (t)
and the next (t C 1) can then be expressed as:
StC1,i D [WŁtC1,i  WŁt,i] C [εtC1,i  εt,i] 1
The first bracketed terms represent the true change in net worth (the signal) and the second
bracketed terms represent the change in measurement error (the noise). Our inferences on the
relationships of saving to other variables are based on the variance in measured gross saving.
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Assuming for simplicity that the measurement errors are uncorrelated with the true levels (a
hypothesis we will find reason to reject below), the variance in measured gross saving is:
2StC1 D [2WŁtC1 C 
2
WŁt  2WŁtC1,WŁt W2tC1 W2t ]
C [2εtC1 C 2εt  2εtC1,εtεtC1 εt g]
2
where, again, the first bracketed terms represent the variance in signal and the second the variance
in noise. The fact that in survey data the 2ε tend to dominate the 
2
WŁ means that noise dominates
signal—something that is only intensified by the fact that there is good reason to expect the
correlation in the error components to be much weaker and, perhaps, even negative1 at the same
time as there is good reason to expect that the correlation in the signal components will be strongly
positive.
While noise in change in panel designs tends to dominate signal, panel designs also provide a
means of reducing the noise in change by allowing the transfer of information from one interview
wave to the next (see e.g. Mathiowetz and McGonagle, 2000). Various forms of dependent
interviewing, in which reports from prior interviews are presented to the respondents in the current
interview, have been employed in panels and a consensus is beginning to form that the benefits
of reduction in ‘false positive’ indications of change far outweigh the costs of increased ‘false
negative’ indications (see e.g. Hill, 1995; Dibbs et al., 1995). An important question is whether
this same conclusion holds for wave-to-wave changes in net-worth components and aggregates.
In this research we introduce a form of dependent interviewing to the HRS and attempt to
evaluate its impact on the quality of net-worth measures. The form of dependent interviewing we
use is what has been called ‘reactive-dependent interviewing’ (see e.g. Mathiowetz and McGonagle,
2000; Brown et al., 1998), in which the respondent is reminded of the prior report only when it
is seriously at odds with the current report. The data collection phase of the study consisted of
calling back in 2001 a subsample of HRS respondents whose reported net-worth components
differed substantially and inexplicably between 1998 and 2000 and asking them to reconcile the
differences. Although we chose this design primarily for reasons of practicality, it also has the
advantage of preserving the independent measures we have been collecting since 1992 while
adding the dependent measures. This is a property that we have incorporated in the dependent
asset reconciliation in our 2002 computer assisted interviewing (CAI) questionnaire. That is, we
first ask about asset values without benefit of past records and then, at the end of the interview,
conduct a reconciliation based on the just collected and the preloaded prior-wave asset values.
This paper is organized in five sections. In Section 2, I will briefly describe the criteria used
in selecting households and net-worth components to be reconciled. I then present, by asset and
response type, the numbers identified, reconciled and corrected as a result of the callback. In
Section 3, the effects of reconciliation on the first four distributional moments and various quantile
breakpoints are presented for representative net-worth components and for the aggregate levels
and wave-to-wave change. The effects of length of recall and changes in economic conditions
from the time of the original data collection to the reconciliation callback are also discussed
briefly in Section 3. Section 4 explores the effects of reconciliation on the empirical validity of the
asset-change data. Finally, I summarize my conclusions and present recommendations for future
reconciliation efforts in Section 5.
1 A negative error correlation would result if there is strong regression to the mean—large positive errors in one wave
being followed by smaller or negative errors in the next.
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2. HISTORY OF SELECTION RULE AND THE DISTRIBUTION OF THE
RECONCILIATION SAMPLE
As noted above, the purpose of this research is to reconcile inexplicable differences in asset
reports between interviewing waves. The basic design of future asset-change reconciliation efforts
was set during a meeting of the HRS Economic Status Working Group (ESWG) on September
25, 1998. This group consists of experts on economic status from around the country. The
Working Group decided early in the discussions that not all asset changes should be reconciled.
Selection of the households and the individual asset components to be reconciled was guided
by two primary considerations. First, we did not want to risk future respondent cooperation.
Bothering respondents with trivial asset changes or with substantial asset changes that are easily
explainable by things already known from prior interviews might well do this. Thus, after lengthy
discussion of the merits of absolute versus proportional asset-change thresholds, we decided to set
a minimum threshold for an individual net-worth component change of $50,000 for it to qualify
for reconciliation. Also, we did not want to bother the respondent with reconciling apparent
asset changes that result simply from changes in categorization of the asset. For example, it
often happens that a respondent will classify an asset as a farm in one wave (perhaps because
he planted some corn) and as real estate in the next wave (perhaps because he is considering
subdividing the land for development). This would result in a large increase in real estate assets
offset by a large decrease in the reported value of the farm. For this reason we set a threshold
for aggregate net-worth change of $150,000—i.e. the absolute value of the wave-to-wave change
in total household net worth must be at least this amount for the household to be eligible for
reconciliation.
The second consideration is that we want our selection of households and net-worth items
to be consistent with what it would be if we were to incorporate the reconciliation as an on-
the-fly component of our CAI instrument in future waves of the HRS. One result of this is
that we would not attempt to reconcile asset changes when there is a change in the financial
respondent.2 The asset values from one wave are preloaded only for the financial respondent
for that wave and, as a result, there would be no preloaded asset values for a new financial
reporter.3
After implementing these rules (technical details of implementation are available from the
author as a research memorandum), we identified 2955 asset items in 1581 households (out
of 11,583 households with the same financial respondents in 1998 and 2000) to be reconciled.
We began contacting and interviewing these on March 26, 2001 and closed out the field effort
on June 13, 2001. We obtained 1255 completed interviews. Once we remove the deceased
(28), those we were unable to find or contact during the relatively brief field period (53),
and those who were too sick or cognitively impaired to respond (25), our response rate
was just over 91%. 40% of the non-respondents were cases in which the household was
contacted but the interview could not be completed within the field period. Some of these
would have been completed if the field period were as long as that of the main study (roughly
11 months).
2 In households with two primary adults the financial respondent is identified by asking which of the adults is most
knowledgeable of financial matters and plans for retirement.
3 We are also very reluctant to reveal to one member of a household what another told us previously—something we
would have to do if we attempted reconciliation when the financial respondent has changed.
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2.1. Alternative Selection Criteria
Although a variety of research interests were represented in the ESWG, it is fair to say that
interest in aggregate wealth accumulation and depletion was dominant. The selection rules chosen
concentrate rather narrowly on those households and asset changes that have major impacts on
aggregate wealth estimates. Other researchers may, however, be interested in the saving and
consumption behaviours in the broader population. In this case selection criteria based on relative
wave-to-wave change in reported assets might be more appropriate. Finally, a selection criterion
based on some combination of absolute and relative change might offer a good compromise for the
broad community of researchers. In Table I, I present various statistics for three specific selection
criteria we might have used. These are:
1. Absolute: 1998 to 2000 change of $150,000 in aggregate and $50,000 in some specific category
(i.e. the criterion we actually used).
2. Relative: 1998 to 2000 change of 175% or more.
3. Mixed: 1998 to 2000 change of $50,000 C absolute and/or 98% C relative.
The relative change percentages were selected to provide roughly equal numbers of eligible
cases under the three alternative criteria. The first column of statistics pertains to the absolute
change criterion we actually used. This yields 55 eligible respondents (3.7% of all eligibles) in
the lowest quintile of the 2000 wealth distribution and 961 (65.9%) in the top wealth quintile.
This is clearly a very wealthy subsample—accounting for more than half (57.5%) of all 2000
wealth and 91.1% of the variance in 1998–2000 wealth change. Column 2 of Table I presents the
corresponding statistics for the sample derived using the relative change criteria. The reconciliation
subsample under this rule would have been considerably poorer, with more than four in ten
households being in the bottom wealth quintile, and would cover roughly one-fifth of the total
wealth in 2000. Nevertheless, (a) the wealthiest households are selected at slightly more than their
population prevalence, (b) more than three-quarters of the variance in absolute change is covered
and (c) nearly 95% of the variance in relative change would be eligible for reconciliation. Finally,
the mixed change criterion (column 3) would appear to offer a nice compromise. It results in over-
representation of households at both extremes of the wealth distribution, covers more than a third
Table I. Characteristics of reconciliation subsample under three selection criteria (11,583








Eligibles in bottom wealth quintile 55 625 361
(3.7%) (53.5%) (25.2%)
Eligibles in top wealth quintile 961 295 558
(65.9%) (20.5%) (37.5%)
Share of 2000 wealth 57.5% 20.9% 37.5%
Share of squared deviations of raw change 91.1% 77.8% 81.7%
Share of squared deviations of relative change 5.5% 93.5% 90.7%
Subsample size (% of total sample) 1581 1537 1589
(12.6%) (12.2%) (12.7%)
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Table II. Distribution of eligible, reconciled and erroneous changes by asset type
Net-worth item # Eligible # Reconciled # Correct # Erroneous
Debts 28 22 8 15
1.0% 78.6% 36.5% 63.6%
Trusts 318 281 156 125
10.8 88.3 55.5 55.5
Other assets 163 136 56 90
5.5 83.5 33.8 66.2
Vehicles 35 30 13 17
1.2 85.7 53.3 56.7
CDs 157 126 69 57
5.3 80.3 52.8 57.2
Accounts 179 155 82 63
6.1 81.0 56.6 53.5
Bonds 87 76 50 39
3.0 87.5 58.7 51.3
Stock 552 367 202 165
15.0 83.0 55.0 55.0
IRAs 295 252 135 118
10.0 85.5 53.2 56.8
Business or farm 259 203 88 115
8.5 81.5 53.5 56.6
Real estate 370 315 135 180
12.6 85.1 52.9 57.1
First home 327 273 182 91
11.1 83.5 66.7 33.3
First mortgage 91 85 56 29
3.1 93.5 65.9 35.1
Second mortgage 6 5 3 2
0.2 83.3 60.0 50.0
Equity loan 7 5 5 0
0.2 71.5 100.0
Mobile home 12 8 2 6
0.5 66.7 25.0 75.0
Second home 155 128 65 63
5.2 83.1 50.8 59.2
Loans second home 25 22 13 9
0.8 88.0 59.1 50.9
Total 2955 2579 1298 1181
100.0% 85.2% 52.5% 57.6%
of year 2000 wealth, and would result in reconciliation of households accounting for eight-tenths
and nine-tenths of variance in absolute and relative change, respectively.
2.2. Distribution of the 2001 Reconciliation Sample
As noted above, Criterion 1 was used in selecting the 2001 asset-change reconciliation sample.
Table II presents the distribution of eligible, reconciled and erroneous asset changes by asset type.
By reconciled we mean that the discrepant asset values were presented to the respondent and the
respondent had the opportunity to dispute and correct the record. By erroneous we mean that the
respondent was presented with the discrepant values and said that the 1998 and/or 2000 value was
wrong. Large and inexplicable changes between 1998 and 2000 were flagged for reconciliation in
each of the 18 net-worth categories investigated. Given the volatility of the stock market over the
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last few years it is not surprising that stocks are the most common 1998–2000 asset type eligible
for reconciliation, with 552 changes flagged. This is 19% of all eligible asset changes observed. Of
these we were able to reconcile 367 (83%) and found that 165 or nearly half were, according to the
respondents, wrong. This fraction (55%) of reconciled asset changes which respondents identify
as erroneous is typical of most asset types. On the low side the exception is first home value and
on the high side are first mortgage and other debts. For the first home and first mortgage variables
the percentages of questionable changes that were wrong are only 33.3% and 35.1%, respectively.
This probably reflects the fact that big changes in house values over a two-year period really do
occur.
Similarly large swings in remaining mortgage principal really do happen as well when
respondents pay off or refinance their mortgages. At the other extreme the error rates for large
changes in ‘other assets’ and debts are 66.2% and 63.6%, respectively. I suspect that respondents
are very uncertain about the value of ‘other assets’, which include such things as jewels, coin and
stamp collections, precious metal, etc. Although there may be similar confusion in the respondent’s
mind on how much they really owe at a point in time, I am less satisfied with this explanation for
the high error rate in the original reports.
Another way of looking at the incidence of questionable asset changes, reconciliation rates and
error rates is to categorize them not by the asset type but by the response types they involve. In
each wave the response can be of three forms: (1) a zero report, (2) a bracket report and (3) a
cardinal (‘exact’) report. For two waves there are eight interesting combinations of these report
types (the zero–zero combination is not of interest here).
Table III presents the frequency of eligible and erroneous asset changes for each combination.
The combination with the most eligible asset changes is the ‘exact’ 1998–‘exact’ 2000, with 1315
(55.6%) reconciliation-eligible asset changes. This is not surprising since the vast majority of all
(non-zero) response combinations are of this type. What is a bit more surprising is that the error
rate for this combination (29.5%) is substantially lower than that for any other combination. The
second most common response type for reconciliation-eligible asset changes is ‘exact’ 1998 and
zero 2000, with 635 eligible changes. This is a case in which a previously existing asset disappears
without a trace. This is just one form of ‘extra-marginal’ change involving a zero in one wave
and a non-zero response in the other. If we combine the elements of the first row with those of
the first column we obtain a total extra-marginal count of 1362, so extra-marginal changes are
slightly more prevalent than the ‘exact–exact’ combination.
Table III. Distribution of eligible and erroneous asset changes by
response type in 1998 and 2000 [erroneous counts and percentages
in brackets]
HRS 1998 HRS 2000
Zero Bracket Cardinal ‘exact’
Zero — 50 (1.5%) 635 (21.5%)
[18 (55%)] [300 (57.2%)]
Bracket 121 (5.1%) 30 (1.0%) 171 (5.8%)
[58 (57.9%)] [12 (50.0%)] [65 (38.0%)]
Cardinal 566 (19.2%) 67 (2.3%) 1,315 (55.6)
‘exact’ [252 (55.5%)] [35 (50.7%)] [388 (29.5%)]
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There are two other notable patterns of asset change types in Table III. First, with respect to
extra-marginal changes, asset disappearances are just about as frequent (675 D 635 C 50) as are
asset appearances (687 D 566 C 121). This suggests a certain symmetry in asset omissions and/or
acquisitions and dispositions across the waves. Secondly, suspicious changes involving brackets4
are significantly more frequent for the 2000 wave (322 D 121 C 30 C 171) than for the 1998 wave
(137 D 50 C 30 C 67). Why this should be the case is not immediately clear.
3. RECONCILIATION AND THE DISTRIBUTIONAL MOMENTS FOR LEVELS AND
CHANGE
The main purpose of the 2001 asset-change reconciliation callback is to see to what extent quasi-
dependent interviewing would affect our estimates of asset levels within waves and asset change
across waves. There is little doubt that the asset measures contain considerable amounts of error
that results in over-dispersion. From examining the interviewer written comments it is also clear
that errors sometimes occur at the very extremes of the distributions, and when they do they can be
very serious.5 Another indication that error is concentrated at the extremes of the distributions is
that initial item non-response in the form of ‘don’t knows’ are subsequently very often found to be
in the highest bracket of the unfolding bracket sequence used to reduce the item non-response. Such
errors can seriously skew the distributions and will reduce the relative frequency of intermediate
deviations from the mean, leading to increased kurtosis.
3.1. House Value
Table IV(a) presents the distributional moments for house value for those reconciliation respon-
dents with a positive value in either 1998 or 2000.6 Housing is the most common form of
non-pension net worth and for most households the most important. The first column of Table IV(a)
refers to the original house value recorded in the 2000 interview and the second is the 2000 value
recorded after reconciliation in 2001. The third and fourth columns are the corresponding 1998
values and the final two columns relate to the 1998–2000 change in the original and reconciled
values. The first thing to note about the 2000 values is that the average is not greatly affected by
reconciliation. It is roughly $200,000 both before and after the callback. The higher moments of
the distribution, however, are all reduced tremendously by reconciliation. The variance is more
than cut in half, the skewness is quartered and the kurtosis is reduced by more than a full order of
magnitude. Surprisingly, the various percentile breakpoints are not affected, which can only mean
that the effect of the reconciliation must be taking place either below the first percentile or above
the 99th. For housing assets the same general pattern of results holds for the 1998 values. There is
some evidence here for shrinkage of the upper tail of the distribution, but otherwise the effects of
reconciliation of housing assets in 1998 is the same as in 2000. As we will see below, this is the
4 Bracket reports in the HRS occur when a respondent will not or cannot provide a cardinal report. In such cases they
are asked a series of questions of the form ‘would it amount to less than, more than or about $x’. See Juster and Smith
(1997) for details.
5 In the 1994 HRS, for instance, one interviewer entered the value of $3,500,000 for a respondent’s total medical
expenditures and wrote in the comment field that the expenditures were $35,000. In the response field she had erroneously
entered dollars and cents rather than simply dollars.
6 Respondents who stated in 2000 that they either bought or sold a home were excluded from the asset-change reconciliation
sample. This means that changes in house value should reflect appreciation or depreciation of the house.
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exception rather than the rule. Perhaps the most interesting results of reconciliation in Table IV(a)
are those related to the 1998–2000 change measures. Here the mean is substantially increased as
a result of reconciliation and the variance is reduced to one-ninth its original value. The kurtosis
is also reduced by more than one order of magnitude. The percentile breakpoints indicate that
most of the effect for change is at the lower end of the distribution. Subsequent examination of
the reconciled data shows that this is due mostly to extra-marginal changes—six respondents in
2000 failed to report home ownership in the original interview but upon reconciliation did ‘fess
up’ to owning one; one of these omitted homes was allegedly worth $900,000.
Table IV. Distributional moments













Mean 222 217 208 195 13.5 22.2
Variance 135e C 9 57.8e C 9 132e C 9 52.5e C 9 167e C 9 18.0e C 9
Skewness 17.17 5.35 17.95 5.08 0.010 1.55
Kurtosis 535.5 32.53 555.5 53.7 511.2 36.22
1st Centile 0 0 0 0 599 325
10th Centile 50 50 60 60 95 55
50th Centile 150 150 150 150 10 10
90th Centile 500 500 375 350 100 100
99th Centile 1500 1500 1500 1000 500 500













Mean 335 285 279.6 273.5 55.0 10.2
Variance 1570e C 9 31.5e C 9 659e C 9 501e C 9 1,660e C 9 501e C 9
Skewness 16.36 5.15 8.93 8.67 9.78 8.11
Kurtosis 355.7 53.75 98.71 100.6 232.0 118.2
1st Centile 0 0 0 0 1200 1200
10th Centile 0 0 0 0 263.5 200
50th Centile 75 75 75 80 0.750 0
90th Centile 900 800 600 600 350 290
99th Centile 5000 2750 3000 3000 2500 1500













Mean 1386 1258 1052 1057 335 201
Variance 9220e C 9 3690e C 9 2680e C 9 2280e C 9 7510e C 9 2020e C 9
Skewness 10.55 5.80 5.61 5.01 9.52 5.33
Kurtosis 156.3 59.7 31.2 25.5 155.8 87.7
1st Centile 1.5 1.6 2.5 8 5317 3225
10th Centile 108 120 153 151 805 597
50th Centile 659 690 581 585 227 150
90th Centile 2968 2837 2328 2506 1285 996
99th Centile 11,500 8602 9565 8230 8607 5563
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Table IV. (Continued )













Mean 368 354 332 333 36.3 21.75
Variance 1770e C 9 1140e C 9 804e C 9 761e C 9 1170e C 9 579e C 9
Skewness 22.08 18.62 15.70 15.86 25.40 27.48
Kurtosis 734.9 635.9 506.0 543.5 1073 1680
1st Centile 10 10 18 16 1356 1223
10th Centile 0 0 1.3 1.5 173 144
50th Centile 110 110 121 121 0 0
90th Centile 774 792 736 740 204 179
99th Centile 4208 3880 3285 3286 1798 1477
A useful exercise is to solve the variance formula presented in the Introduction for the unknown
true and error correlations. We can do this by assuming, for illustrative purposes, that reconciliation
reduces the error variances to zero. When we do so, we obtain an estimate of the true wave-to-
wave correlation of housing values of 0.83 and of wave-to-wave error correlation of only 0.1070.
Furthermore, the ratios of error to true variance are 1.35 and 2.11 for the 2000 and 1998 original
reports, respectively. Since some measurement error certainly remains after reconciliation, the
actual correlations and ratios are probably even more extreme.
3.2. Value of Stocks
The effect of the reconciliation on the distributional moments for house value is somewhat
atypical in that both the 2000 and 1998 distributions were substantially affected. In this respect
stocks provide a more typical picture of the effects of reconciliation. Table IV(b) presents
the distributional moments and percentile breakpoints for stock assets. As with home value,
reconciliation resulted in major reductions in the first four moments of the 2000 stock value
distribution as well as in the centile breakpoints at the upper end of the distribution. When we
solve the variance formula as in the preceding subsection we obtain an estimate of the correlation
of the true component of 0.52 and of the error components of 0.55. The 1998 distribution, however,
was hardly affected at all. This is typical of most of the other net-worth components (tables for
all 18 net-worth components are available from the author). What is not typical, however, is
the estimated error-to-true variance estimate of nearly 50 in 2000 and the large reduction in the
1998–2000 change in stock values that comes about as a result of the 2001 reconciliation.
The fact that the callback was conducted anywhere from six to 18 months after the original
2000 data collections may introduce a bias which would not be encountered with an immediate
on-the-fly reconciliation. This potential bias is that respondents may tend to value the asset not
at its worth at the time of the original interview, but at a more recent time. The wording of the
questions left the timing of the valuation unclear. A typical question, for instance, might begin:
‘According to our records in 2000 you had stocks worth $x. . .’. In retrospect we should have
said: ‘According to our records in June of 2000, when we last talked with you, you had stocks
worth. . .’. The results in Table IV(b) for ‘Stocks’ look suspicious to me from this point of view.
Most of the original stock data for 2000 were provided prior to July 2000—a period when the
stock market was near its all-time high. Most of the reconciled data were provided after April
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2001, after many stocks had suffered dramatic declines in price. The reduction in the 1998–2000
increase in stock value from $55,000 in the original data to $10,200 in the reconciled data may be
more a reflection of the 2000–2001 declines in the market than a reflection of better reporting in
the dependent callback. This may also be responsible for decreases in estimated growth of value
of IRAs and even Trusts, since the portfolios of these often have considerable assets in the form
of stock. I will return to this in Section 4, below.
3.3. Total Net Worth
Although the individual net-worth components are interesting, the bottom line on judging the
efficacy of reconciliation requires us to examine the total of the 18 non-pension wealth components.
Tables IV(c) and (d) provide the distributional moments for these totals—Table IV(c) does so for
the 1255 reconciliation sample respondents and Table IV(d) for the entire HRS sample of 11,583
respondents with the same financial respondent in both 1998 and 2000. For the reconciliation
respondents, reconciliation resulted in a modest decrease in the mean level of wealth in 2000 but
hardly any change in 1998 measured wealth. Even more dramatic is the reduction in the higher-
order distributional moments in 2000. The variance is cut to roughly 50% of its original value,
the skewness to about 56% of its original value and the kurtosis to less than 50%.
The mean estimated 1998–2000 change in net worth was reduced from 335 to 201 (i.e. by
50%) and the variance from 7510 to 2020 (i.e. by 73%). The higher-order moments of the change
distribution are also greatly reduced by reconciliation. The centile breakpoints suggest that most
of the effect of reconciliation is taking place in the tails of the distribution. Surprisingly, we obtain
almost the same conclusions with respect to the mean and variance of change when we examine
the entire sample of 11,583. The mean change (not shown) drops from 36.6 thousand dollars to
21.8 thousand (a 40% decrease) and the variance drops by 51% (from 1.17e C 12 to 0.58e C 12).
This is a remarkable result. Reconciling less than one-ninth of the sample cuts the variance in
wave-to-wave change in net worth in half.
3.4. Length of Recall and Changes in Economic Environment
Another aspect of the effects of reconciliation apparent in Tables IV(b) and (c) (as well as in
corresponding tables for most other asset types) is that it affects the most current data (2000)
much more than the older data (1998). Both probit and Tobit analyses of reconciliation (results
not shown) reveal strong and significant negative effects of the number of months between the
1998 report and the reconciliation report in 2001—i.e. the more distant the report the less likely
the respondent is to correct the record and the smaller is the absolute value of the correction if they
do. This effect does not appear for the 2000 reconciliation.7 Furthermore, changes in the Dow-
Jones Industrial Average between the date of the original report and the date of reconciliation,
something that should be totally irrelevant, exert a strong and significant positive effect on the
probability of changing the report after reconciliation for 1998 but not for 2000. My interpretation
of these results is that the respondent’s uncertainty of the truth increases with the length of
recall and, when uncertain, respondents tend to accept the previously recorded amounts. They
are also more apt to be influenced by irrelevant changes in outside conditions. This leads me to
7 Very similar results were found in the 1983 Panel Study of Income Dynamics Validity Study (see Duncan and Hill,
1985).
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conclude that timing is critical to the success of reactive-dependent interviewing in improving
reports of asset amounts—the sooner a report is reconciled with previously reported data, the
better.
4. EFFECTS OF RECONCILIATION ON MEASURES OF ASSOCIATION
The descriptive statistics just presented show that the reconciled asset data are substantially
different from the original. The question is: are they any better? Lacking direct external validating
data there is little we can do beyond examining the effects of reconciliation on correlations with
other survey measures and on regression coefficients. Ceteris paribus, if reconciliation is actually
improving the quality of the wealth measures, and especially of the wealth change measures,
we would expect the strength of these associations and effects to increase. Table V presents the
correlation of change in non-pension net worth with a host of other HRS survey measures. With
only a couple of exceptions the reconciled change data are more strongly correlated with nine of
the 13 variables examined. The main exceptions to this are for marital status (whether married)
and education, for which reconciliation has little effect, and for receipt of pension income and the
Table V. Correlations of original and reconciled net-worth change [11,578a respondents: p-values in
parentheses]
Original 1998–2000
change in total net worth
Reconciled 1998–2000 change
in total net worth
Age 0.0251ŁŁ 0.0298ŁŁ
(0.0096) (0.0013)




Education (years) 0.0377ŁŁ 0.0291ŁŁ
(0.0000) (0.0017)
Family income 0.0101 0.0555ŁŁ
(0.2775) (0.0000)
Receiving social security 0.0225Ł 0.0276ŁŁ
(0.0155) (0.0029)
Receiving pension income 0.0201Ł 0.0152
(0.0153) (0.1027)
Covered by Medicare 0.0285ŁŁ 0.0389ŁŁ
(0.0022) (0.0000)
Covered by employer-provided health insurance 0.0266ŁŁ 0.0362ŁŁ
(0.0052) (0.0001)
Subjective probability of living to 85C 0.0170C 0.0151
(0.0666) (0.1297)
Subjective probability of $100k bequest 0.0555ŁŁ 0.0523ŁŁ
(0.0000) (0.0000)
Subjective probability of nursing home 0.0111 0.0191Ł
(0.2320) (0.0398)
Change in household work hours: 2000–2002 0.0053 0.00190C
(0.5951) (0.0565)
a Five cases were eliminated from this analysis because of missing data on age.
† , Ł , ŁŁ Significant at the 90, 95 and 99 percent level of confidence, respectively.
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respondent’s subjective probability of surviving to age 85. For these there is a lower significance
level for the reconciled change than for the original change.
4.1. Wealth Change as an Independent Variable
The effect of reconciliation on the association of change in work hours and change in wealth, seen
in the last entries of Table V, while not extremely strong, is of particular interest since much of the
measurement error literature deals extensively with the effects of error in independent variables
on regression parameter estimates. We can imagine a model of the form:8
Hti D ˛ C ˇWti C εti 3
Here exogenous changes in wealth are hypothesized to reduce work hours (i.e. ˇ < 0).9 Indeed,
much has been made recently, at least in the popular press, about the wealth effect of the run-
up (and decline) of stock prices on retirement aspirations, plans and decisions. Under classical
assumptions (the validity of which we will investigate below), measurement error in the Wti will
result in ˇ being biased towards zero. Table VI presents regression coefficients of a version of
this model, in which explicit control is made for capital gains in various asset types, i.e.
Hti D ˛ C ˇWti C Kti C εti 4
Table VI. Change in labour supply as a function of gross saving and capital gains: concurrent and lagged by
reconciliation status
Concurrent changea
(HH hours 2000—HH hours 1998)
Next period changeb









Gross saving (W98,2k) 0.0213C 0.0583ŁŁ 0.0008 0.0501Ł
(1.69) (2.59) (0.06) (2.08)
Capital gains
Farm/business 0.1182ŁŁ 0.0885Ł 0.0068 0.1191Ł
(3.00) (2.57) (0.17) (2.06)
Stock 0.0385Ł 0.0650Ł 0.0150 0.0391
(1.98) (2.29) (0.70) (1.30)
Real estate 0.0267 0.0280 0.0051 0.0155
(0.92) (0.52) (0.15) (0.25)
Housing 0.0131 0.0602 0.0093 0.0525
(0.30) (1.12) (0.21) (0.75)
Adj. R-square 0.05% 0.03% 0.05% 0.05%
F 2.25Ł 1.67 0.19 2.10C
a Sample D 11, 583 stable households with same financial respondent 1998 and 2000.
b Sample D 10, 135 stable households 1998 and 2000 surviving to 2002.
† , Ł , ŁŁ Significant at the 90, 95 and 99 percent level of confidence, respectively.
8 See Bound et al. (2001) for a review of this literature. We should be careful not to take this model too seriously, since we
can just as easily imagine causation running in the opposite direction—pending retirement may present a strong incentive
to save.
9 An alternative hypothesis is that wealth changes reduce labour supply with a lag. Thus the effect of wealth changes
between 1998 and 2000 will show up in hours changes between 2000 and 2002. We will examine both of the implied
specifications.
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where  is a vector of parameters relating the vector of capital gains (K), of various sorts, to
changes in work hours. This allows us to test for differential effects of active saving (ˇ) and the
various forms of capital gains on changes in labour supply. The first two columns of Table VI
present estimated effects of wealth changes on concurrent labour supply, while the second two
columns present estimated effects if wealth changes operate with a lag. The first column of results
for concurrent hours change pertains to the asset changes as originally measured, and the next
column pertains to the reconciled asset data. Comparing the two we see that reconciliation results in
a much stronger ‘effect’ of total wealth change on hours change. Since we are controlling for capital
gains we are tempted to interpret the coefficient on gross saving as the association of active saving
on changes in household work hours supplied. Assuming the reconciled data to be accurate, the
quite noticeable attenuation of the coefficient obtained with the noisier unreconciled data implies
a ‘reliability ratio’ of less than 36% for unreconciled gross asset change.10 Interestingly, with
both types of data in the concurrent model as well as with reconciled data in the lagged model
the effect of saving on hours change is significantly negative and significantly different from the
positive effects of capital gains in stocks and businesses or farms. There is even some evidence
in the concurrent model for a stronger positive effect of capital gains in housing assets.
Table VII. Regression analyses of original and reconciled gross saving (W2000  W1998) [11,578a households
with same financial respondent: t-ratios in parentheses]
OLS









Constant 77.5989 3.1709 5.8873
(0.78) (0.05) (1.61)
Age 1.3173 1.1578 0.2597ŁŁ
(1.33) (1.52) (7.81)
Education 7.7055Ł 1.7076 0.2669ŁŁ
(2.55) (0.77) (2.76)
Married 23.6585 3.3790 3.3052ŁŁ
(1.10) (0.22) (5.99)
Family income 0.1778 0.2525ŁŁ 0.1595ŁŁ
(1.38) (2.80) (37.86)
Probability of bequest $100kC 1.5128ŁŁ 0.9083ŁŁ 0.1821ŁŁ
(5.11) (5.36) (20.03)
Probability of nursing home 0.3587 0.3955 0.0330Ł
(0.77) (1.21) (2.32)
Probability of Living to 85C 0.3297 0.1511 0.0099
(0.90) (0.55) (0.89)
Adj. R-square 0.37% 0.39% 0.38%
Root MSE 1079.80 759.56 —
1% Influence index 92.5% 90.9% 37.5%
a Five cases were eliminated from this analysis because of missing data on age.
Ł , ŁŁ Significant at the 95 and 99 percent level of confidence, respectively.
10 See Fuller (1987) for a thorough discussion of classical measurement-error models and for definitions of various statistics
such as the reliability ratio (D 2true/2true C 2error ).
Copyright  2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. J. Appl. Econ. 21: 845–860 (2006)
DOI: 10.1002/jae
858 D. H. HILL
4.2. Wealth Change as the Dependent Variable
Although reconciliation improves the empirical validity of the asset-change data, the influence
of extreme changes is still sufficiently large to obscure the effects of most covariates. Table VII
presents regression analyses of the 1998–2000 net-worth change for the original and reconciled
data. While the regression for the reconciled data is significantly better than for the original data
(primarily because of the coefficient on income), its fit is still not very impressive. The bequest
result is interesting, but should not be taken too seriously—it is probably a reflection of the
fact that the respondent has to have $100,000 to potentially bequeath. The final row in the table
presents the ‘1% Influence Index’ of cases in the top and bottom percentile of the distribution.11
The 92.5% figure for the original data can be interpreted as saying that the top and bottom 1% of
the original-change distribution accounted for 92.5% of the OLS objective function (the total sum
of squares) for the constant-only model. This means that these few cases dominate the regression
analysis. Reconciliation reduces the tail-influence index to 90.9%, but the few extreme cases still
dominate the analysis. To see the structure of net-worth change any more clearly, the analyst must
do something to reduce the influence of outliers. The final column of figures in Table VII presents
the results of a median-regression version of the saving model in which the objective function
is the sum of absolute deviations rather than of squared deviations. The 1% tail influence index
is reduced to 37.5% and fit of the model is improved—virtually all of the covariates become
significant, primarily because the standard errors (not shown) are greatly reduced. One interesting
substantive result in this specification is that the effect of anticipating entering a nursing home
becomes significantly negative—i.e. those anticipating entering a nursing home do not save as
much as others or may even dis-save. To the best of my knowledge this is the only evidence of
the asset-spend-down hypothesis that has been seen with HRS data.
4.3. Error Correlations
Finally, Bound et al. (2001) strongly encourage researchers to test the ‘classical’ assumptions
of measurement error models whenever validating data is available. While far from perfect,
our reconciled data is a form of validating data and with it we can construct crude estimates
of measurement error according to Oεti  WOt,i  WRt,i. Table VIII presents the correlation of these
estimated errors for 1998 and 2000 with each other, with their components and with other variables
of interest to analysts. The correlation of errors across waves is negative and significant which,











Oε1998 0.0802Ł 0.2366Ł −0.0553Ł 0.0597Ł 0.0188Ł 0.0253Ł 0.1310Ł
Oε2000 1.0000 0.0666Ł 0.0915Ł 0.5965Ł 0.0510Ł 0.0333Ł 0.0136
Oε2000  Oε1998 0.9598Ł 0.0128 0.0985Ł 0.5703Ł 0.0530Ł 0.0385Ł 0.0286Ł
Ł Significant at the 95 percent level of confidence.
11 This is simply the fraction of total sum of squares or of absolute deviations accounted for by the cases in the 1.0%
tails of the distribution.
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as we can see from the variance of change formula in the Introduction, will clearly reduce the
signal-to-noise ratio in wealth-change data.
Furthermore, by construction we would expect the correlations printed in bold in Table VIII
to be strongly positive and negative for original and reconciled reports, respectively, and roughly
equal in absolute size. The error correlations with the original measures are as expected, but
those with the reconciled measures are small (but significantly) negative for 1998 and small (but
significantly) positive for 2000. This means that those with high ‘true’ wealth in 1998 tended to
reduce their reports from the original value upon reconciliation (in 2001), whereas those with high
wealth in 2000 tended to increase their reports from the original value. Why this should be is a
mystery to this author, but what is clear is that the classical assumptions of measurement error
models are highly suspect.
The last column in Table VIII presents the correlations of error and error change with family
income in 1998. The correlation of the change in error and family income explains the effects
of reconciliation on the income coefficient noted in our discussion of Table VII. The relevant
regression coefficient is:
Ǒ s, D Y0Y1Y0Sorig D [Y0Y]1[Y0SR C ε] D [Y0Y]1[Y0SR] C [Y0Y]1[Y0ε]] 5
where Y is income and S is saving. The rightmost term (Y0ε) corresponds to the lower right
entry in Table VII (0.0286) and the result is that the regression coefficient of saving on income
is biased towards 1 by the negative correlation of income and measurement error in wealth
change. It is important to note that this bias is not a manifestation of measurement-error induced
attenuation discussed so extensively in the measurement-error literature. Instead, it is a result of
bias due to violations of the classical measurement-error assumptions of that literature and could
be of either sign and of any magnitude. Interestingly, this is exactly the same conclusion reached
20 years ago in our analysis of the Panel Study of Income Dynamics Validity Study (see Duncan
and Hill, 1985, p. 529).
5. CONCLUSIONS
Panel measures of change are often so noisy as to seriously affect their utility in statistical models.
The change in reporting error (noise) dominates change in true values (signal). In this paper I have
shown that asking a small subsample (12%) of Health and Retirement Study respondents with
large and inexplicable wave-to-wave changes in net-worth components to reconcile the recorded
differences reduces the variance in total net worth by half for the entire sample. I argue that
most of this reduction is the result of reduction in error variance, and show that the reconciliation
interview (a form of reactive-dependent interviewing) substantially improves the empirical validity
of the data. This improvement shows up in the form of increased magnitude and significance of
simple correlations of net-worth change (gross saving) with other survey measures, with which
theory suggests it should be related. It also shows up in multivariate models, both when net-worth
changes or gross saving is an independent variable and when it is the dependent variable. Classical
measurement-error models show that under a rather strict set of assumptions error in independent
variables will attenuate regression coefficients. My findings, when gross saving measured by
wave-to-wave change in total net worth, are consistent with this. Under the classical assumptions,
measurement error in the dependent variable should simply reduce the estimated goodness of fit and
the significance of independent variables. Again there is some evidence of this in my analysis—the
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root mean square error of the model using reconciled data is 30% lower than that using unreconciled
data, and the adjusted R-square of the model does increase slightly after reconciliation. The data
also, however, cast serious doubts on the classical measurement-error model assumptions. Taking
the reconciled reports as valid and using them to construct measurement error estimates I obtain
strong and significant correlations of these errors with the level of gross saving and its component,
as well as with a key covariate—family income. This can result in a bias which is quite distinct
from the attenuation bias of the classical model in that it can be of either sign and of any magnitude.
As a result of this research the HRS now incorporates a form of reactive-dependent interviewing
in its main computer assisted questionnaire. Reconciliation is now triggered whenever the
current report of a net-worth component is seriously at odds with the prior-wave report and
is implemented at the end of the biennial interview after the normal net-worth questions. This
research also suggests, however, that the HRS might want to re-evaluate the rules used in triggering
reconciliation. These are currently based on absolute change in asset values, but a mixed trigger
based on both absolute and relative change may be superior.
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